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COMMENTS
THE PARADOX OF THE-PROSECUTOR: JUSTICE VERSUS
CONVICTION DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT
"Guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."' These words set
forth the dual responsibility of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal
trial: the task of seeking justice, while at the same time, as an advo-
cate, the duty of obtaining convictions.2 In Berger v. United States, 3
Justice Sutherland described this dual function and the dangers of
its abuse:
The [prosecutor]-is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . .He
may prosecute with eagerness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce wrongful convictions as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.
It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or lesser
degree, has confidence that these obligations, which so plainly
rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed.
Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations, and, espe-
cially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much
weight against the accused when they should properly carry
none.4
Since the paradox of the prosecuting attorney is put to its greatest
test during the summation stage of the criminal proceedings, this
Comment will analyze the problem of the prosecutor's forensic mis-
conduct during his closing argument.
1. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
2. "A public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek
justice, not merely convict." ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF THE LA. STATE BAR AssOCIA-
TION, ARTICLE XVI, EC 7-13.
3. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
4. Id. at 88. In all cases in which the issue of improper argument by the district
attorney is raised, it must be noted that in Louisiana the prosecutor has a strategic
advantage in being allowed the final closing argument. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 765(6).
This is "the final impression implanted in the minds of the jurors by the adversary
counsel in the trial, which the accused has no opportunity to rebut either by taking
the stand himself, calling witnesses or producing other evidence-not even by denun-
ciation of the remark by his own counsel's argument." State v. Carite, 244 La. 928,
930, 155 So. 2d 21, 23 (1963).
COMMENTS
Prosecutor's Forensic Misconduct
One legal writer has defined the prosecutor's forensic miscon-
duct' as:
any activity by the prosecutor which tends to divert the jury from
making its determination of guilt or innocence by weighing the
legally admitted evidence in the manner prescribed by law. It
commonly involves an appeal to the juror's prejudices, fears, or
notions of popular sentiment by presenting to them inadmissible
evidence; or urging them to make inferences not based on the
evidence; or to disregard the evidence altogether and base their
determination on wholly irrelevant factors. The jury may also be
encouraged to disregard the weighing process prescribed by law
and substitute one more favorable to the state, or otherwise to
misapprehend its function.,
Various writers have characterized such misconduct as an evidence
problem created by the prosecutor's remarks beyond the scope of the
evidence while not under oath or subject to cross-examination.7 Oth-
ers have deemed the issue an ethical one.' All agree, however, that
such conduct violates a principle basic to the proper administration
of criminal justice: the due process right of each accused to a fair trial
by an impartial jury."
The scope of the closing argument is set out in article 774 of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure:
The argument shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the
lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state or defendant
5. Although none has been wholly satisfactory, many reasons have been suggested
for such trial tactics, among which one might include: political motivation; community
pressure; inexperience; the spirit of advocacy; an effort to overcome the favorable
position which the law affords an accused in the criminal trial; or merely a retaliation
to the remarks of defense counsel.
6. Comment, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 946, 949 (1954). See also Alschuler, Courtroom
Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. REV. 629 (1972); Bouska, The
Prosecutor's Closing Argument in Kansas, 17 KAN. L. REV. 419 (1969); Singer, Forensic
Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-And How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REV. 227 (1968);
Comment, 42 J. CRIM. LAW 73 (1951); Comment, 6 UTAH L. REv. 108 (1958); Note, 47
IOWA L. REV. 1131 (1962).
7. Id. Argument by the district attorney which exceeds permissible bounds by
going beyond the evidence admitted may be violative of the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution which provides that every accused has the right to be
confronted by the witnesses against him.
8. Singer, Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-And How It Grew, 20
ALA. L. REV. 227 (1968); Comment, 6 UTAH L. REV. 108, 111 (1958).
9. U.S. CONST. amend VI; LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 9.
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may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case.
The argument shall not appeal to prejudice.
The State's rebuttal shall be confined to answering the argu-
ment of the defendant ...
Although the prosecutor's closing argument encompasses a wide
range of potential dispute, an analysis of the jurisprudence reveals
several areas of recurring controversy.
Inflammatory Remarks and Inferences
During the state's closing argument, it is improper for the prose-
cutor to make inflammatory remarks or inferences directed toward
the accused."' This tactic appeals to the prejudices and sympathies
of the jury and interjects issues both irrelevant and immaterial to the
trial. Such comments are often aimed at persuading the jurors to
ignore the evidence and the law and to convict the defendant because
of the supposed danger to society if he is allowed to go free.
In State v. McGregor," the district attorney in his argument
stated that police officers are specially trained to encounter persons
such as the defendant, whom he referred to as an "unpredictable
animal."'" The Louisiana supreme court affirmed the murder convic-
tion, finding the trial judge's admonition sufficient to erase the re-
mark from the minds of the jury. The court relied on its earlier deci-
sion in State v. Vernon, 3 a case involving a murder in which the
victim was brutally kicked and beaten to death. The majority there
found that "the statement of the prosecuting attorney that appellant
was an 'animal' and the question he asked the jury, 'Who's safe in
this city with men like him on the street?' were fully justified by the
evidence."'" Going further, it was stated that "[t]his court has held
on many occasions that invective remarks by a prosecuting attorney
are permissible when supported by the evidence in the case."' 5 Such
10. Article 771 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the normal rem-
edy for such remarks is an instruction to disregard; however, "the court may grant a
mistrial if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure the defendant a
fair trial."
11. 257 La. 956, 244 So. 2d 846 (1971).
12. id.
13. 251 La. 1099, 208 So. 2d 690 (1968).
14. Id. at 1114, 208 So. 2d at 695. (Emphasis added.)
15. Id. State v. Maney, 242 La. 223, 135 So. 2d 473 (1961) ("narcotic fiend"); State
v. Cortez, 241 La. 610, 129 So. 2d 792 (1961) ("hardened criminal"); State v. Davis,
178 La. 203, 151 So. 78 (1933) ("rats"); State v. Thomas, 161 La. 1010, 109 So. 819
(1926) ("infuriated brute"); State v. Meche, 114 La. 231, 38 So. 152 (1905) ("incarnate
devil").
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inflammatory statements involve a subjective determination of the
defendant's guilt, and it is difficult to comprehend how they can be
"justified by the evidence," especially in light of article 774 which
expressly forbids any "appeal to prejudice" in the argument."6
A classic illustration of prosecutorial abuse by appealing to the
prejudice and sympathies of the jurors was made by a district attor-
ney in State v. Brumfield 7 wherein the following statements were
made:
You have two eye witnesses who looked out that window and
saw that defendant with a gun blazing in his hand, still shooting
at the victim. That's quite a scene if you will imagine it in your
minds, a lady running down the street with blood-curdling
screams, with a huge man following her with a gun shooting at
her. Think about that when you go back in the jury room ...
But I ask you this, and ask you to think about this when you
go in the jury room, how about the rights of Emma Albritton. She
was a Christian girl, she worked for a living, she lived with her
mother and father, and she was a credit to the City of Hammond.
She didn't bother anybody. This man sitting here-look at
him-Fred Wilson Brumfield, he arrested her by blocking the
road, he prosecuted her in the street, he became her jury, he
found her guilty, he sentenced her to death and he went one step
further, he was her executioner-right in the streets of Ham-
mond.
[Aind he did all of this because of the lack of response to
his unwanted attention-this big man and this little woman.
Now when he shot her he took over all the functions of law that
are working in this courtroom to protect him-he took them away
from her, but he's getting that protection here today. He shot her
in the back in cold blood and she never had a chance."
This same approach was taken in State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 360, 129 So. 2d 12,
27 (1960), where the district attorney declared in his argument that the accused,
standing trial for aggravated rape, was a "primitive beast of the jungle" and further
stated, "I wish I could call him worse than a primitive beast of the jungle .... " The
court found these remarks to be proper deductions and conclusions based on the
testimony of the prosecutrix.
16. See State v. Kaufman, 278 So. 2d 86 (La. 1973), where the court on rehearing
reversed a murder conviction, partly because of the racial prejudice created by the
district attorney's argument which was grounds for a mandatory mistrial upon the
defendant's request. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 771.
17. 263 La. 147, 267 So. 2d 553 (1972).
18. Id. at 157, 267 So. 2d at 556.
19. Id. at 161, 267 So. 2d at 557.
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Although the Louisiana supreme court affirmed the conviction, Jus-
tice Barham dissented, and recognizing that this "unnecessarily mel-
odramatic and lurid" argument was intended to arouse the emotions
of the jurors, called for a more rigid interpretation of article 774.2I
In comparison, the Fifth Circuit appears to be much quicker to
reverse when the federal prosecutor exceeds the bounds of permissible
argument."' This view is illustrated in Hall v. United States,2 where-
in the accused was referred to as a "hoodlum."" In reversing, the
Fifth Circuit declared:
This type of shorthand characterization of an accused, not based
on evidence, is especially likely to stick in the minds of the jury
and influence its deliberations. Out of the usual welter of grey
facts, it starkly rises-succinct, pithy, colorful, and expressed in
a sharp break with the decorum which the citizen expects from
the representative of his government. 21
Personal Opinion of the District Attorney
Closely related to the problem of prejudicial remarks is the dis-
trict attorney's assertion of his own personal opinion as to the guilt
of the accused or the credibility of witnesses. The Canons of Ethics
20. Id. at 163, 267 So. 2d at 559. In State v. Dennis, 250 La. 125, 194 So. 2d 720
(1967), a murder trial, the district attorney in his argument declared, in effect, that if
the jury could not return a verdict of guilty as charged, they might as well pin a medal
on the defendant and turn him loose so he could take his axe to his next victim. As
the defense noted "the State did not have the right to make the jury think it was its
duty to convict rather than weigh the evidence and render a fair and impartial ver-
dict." Id. at 130, 194 So. 2d at 725. However, the court found that no prejudice was
created nor did such argument influence the jury or contribute to the verdict. But see
Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1972), where the prosecutor made
the following appeal to the jury: "I hope you realize that there is more at stake today
than one man's freedom. I think there is at stake today the protection and safety of
society . . . .I am asking you not to allow this man to go back on the street and to
redo those things he has done." The court found this to be harmful constitutional error.
21. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943); United States v. Bugros,
304 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1962); Traxler v. United States, 293 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1961);
Handford v. United States, 249 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1958); Benham v. United States,
215 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1954).
22. 419 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1969).
23. Id. at 587. In Hall the court held that no objection was necessary and that the
court on its own motion should have instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's
remarks. See also Steele v. United States, 222 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1955) (wherein the
court reversed after the prosecution had characterized the defendant as a "Dr. Jekyll
and Mr. Hyde").
24. Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1969).
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expressly reprobate this type of conduct,2" primarily because such
statements may cause impressionable jurors to believe that the dis-
trict attorney's opinion is entitled to independent weight, due either
to his experience or an unrevealed superior knowledge of facts. " In
State v. Landry,2" a murder trial wherein the issue of self-defense was
crucial, the prosecutor stated:
I believe, I'm convinced that it was that hammer. Somebody said
it wasn't, somebody said he thought he [the victim] had a ham-
mer; and somebody said he didn't see anything in his hands. I
believe he had the hammer .... 111
Affirming the conviction, the supreme court found that this was pro-
per. However, while it is permissible argument to draw logical conclu-
sions from the evidentiary facts, the thrust of these statements ap-
pears to have been an assertion of the district attorney's personal
opinion concerning the inconsistency in the testimony of the wit-
nesses.
In the earlier case of State v. Leming,2" the court actually con-
doned the district attorney's personal opinion that the defendant
"had sworn under oath to two of the most damnable lies he had ever
heard." :'"' The court did not find it objectionable since "it was nothing
more than a denunciation . . . during the trial. ' 31 However, since it
is the function of the jury alone to weigh the evidence in determining
guilt or credibility, such personal opinions do not seem to be within
the permissible bounds of closing argument. 2
25. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF LA. STATE BAR AssoCIATION, ARTICLE XVI, DR
7-106: "a lawyer shall not ... assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause,
as to the credibility of a witness .... or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused;
but he may argue, on his analysis of evidence, for any position or conclusion with
respect to the matters therein."
26. Even without the insinuation of unrevealed knowledge by the district attor-
ney, the privilege of asserting a personal opinion is given only to an expert and then
only while he is under oath and subject to cross-examination. By allowing the district
attorney to persist in this tactic, a false issue is interjected into the trial, i.e., the
reliability of counsel.
27. 262 La. 32, 262 So. 2d 360 (1972).
28. Id. at 37, 262 So. 2d at 362. (Emphasis added.)
29. 217 La. 257, 46 So. 2d 262 (1950).
30. Id. at 305, 46 So. 2d at 279.
31. Id.
32. See State v. Goree, 245 La. 389, 397-98, 158 So. 2d 203, 206 (1963), where the
district attorney stated in his closing argument that "each of the four defendants
testified to the same story; that they had been well coached; and that he wanted to
call the jury's attention to this fact in deciding the case." The court held that an
instruction to disregard removed this prejudice. See also State v. Jackson, 227 La. 642,
80 So. 2d 105 (1955).
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Justice Tate dissented from the court's holding on original hear-
ing in State v. Kaufman,3 3 declaring that the closing argument of the
prosecution consisted of various prejudicial tactics which denied the
defendants their right to a fair trial. There the district attorney
stated:
Isay there's some lying here. Delores Williams lied. I think I have
already said that Delores Williams is not on trial here today, but
she is a murderess, she was right there with them, Iam convinced
she drove the car.
3 4
Justice Tate found this to be an expression of the district attorney's
own personal opinion of one of the co-conspirator's guilt. His only
explanation for the majority decision seemed to be that they over-
looked the prosecutor's misconduct because of the brutality of the
crime.
In contrast to the Louisiana supreme court, the Fifth Circuit
strictly limits the expression of personal opinion by the prosecution.3 1
The prosecutor in United States v. Lamerson6 said: "I firmly believe
what they said is the truth. I know it is the truth, and I expect you
do, too.":" There, the court held this was reversible error, "the infer-
ence being that he had outside knowledge. ' ' 31 Such statements as "we
try to prosecute only the guilty" 3 have also been found to constitute
reversible error since they take "guilt as a pre-determined fact."40 The
Fifth Circuit has recognized that "the prosecutor may neither dis-
pense with the presumption of innocence nor denigrate the function
of the trial nor sit as a thirteenth juror,"4 but the Louisiana supreme
court has consistently been more liberal in this regard."
33. 278 So. 2d 86 (La. 1973). In Kaufman the court reversed the conviction on
rehearing, but on other grounds.
34. Id. at 94-95. (Emphasis added.)
35. See United States v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Schartner, 426 F.2d 470
(3d Cir. 1970); Gradsky v. United States, 373 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1967).
36. 457 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1972).
37. Id. at 372. (Emphasis added.)
38. Id.
39. Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1969).
40. Id. at 587.
41. Id.
42. For further examples of the leniency reflected by the court in favor of the
prosecutor, see State v. Daniels, 262 La. 475, 487-88, 263 So. 2d 859, 863 (1972) (where
the district attorney argued that it was "only natural that he would testify in this
manner. . . . IlI]f I were charged with the crime that he is charged with I wouldn't
admit it either. I can't think of a more horrible thing for a grown man to commit on a
small ten year old girl."); State v. Hopper, 251 La. 77, 115, 203 So. 2d 222, 260 (1967)
(wherein the district attorney stated that: "[a] picture is worth ten thousand words.
[Vol. 34
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Comment on the Failure of the Accused to Testify
The United States Supreme Court held in Griffin v. California4
that any comment on the failure of the defendant to take the stand
was violative of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination because it destroyed the privilege "by making its asser-
tion costly."' Article 770(3) of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Proce-
dure has implemented this decision by providing that a mistrial is
mandatory if requested by the defendant whenever the district attor-
ney "in argument, refers directly or indirectly to . . .the failure of
the defendant to testify in his own defense. . . ."I' An admonition
will not suffice unless the defendant limits his request to such an
instruction' The jurisprudence is unclear as to exactly what consti-
tutes comment on the failure of the accused to testify. However,
recent cases seem to limit Griffin and article 770(3) to direct com-
ment.
During his closing argument in State v. Howard,"7 the district
attorney stated that "we don't know, but there are many reasons why
he did what he did. He has not seen fit to tell us . . . ."' The
supreme court denied a motion for a mistrial, holding that the district
attorney, who had placed a tape recording of the defendant's confes-
sion on the rail of the jury box, "did not intend to bring the jury's
attention to the failure of defendant to testify, although the state-
I had a lot of pictures and you all couldn't see them," thus implying outside knowl-
edge.); State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 1038, 221 So. 2d 484, 500 (1964) (where the
prosecutor stated that "[tihere isn't any evidence that would warrant mercy or clem-
ency on your part .... ", thus implying duty to convict.). See also State v. Wilkerson,
261 La. 342, 259 So. 2d 871 (1972); State v. Viator, 246 La. 809, 815, 167 So. 2d 374,
377 (1964) (where the district attorney argued to the jury "[tihat the element of intent
to influence the conduct of a witness can be an intent to make that witness lose his
temper." The court upheld the conviction of public bribery holding that the district
attorney had as much right to err in his law as the defense did. It seems that such an
inaccurate statement of the law, coupled with the judge's failure to instruct the jury
to disregard after overruling the objection, deprived the accused of a fair trial.)
43. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
44. Id. at 614.
45. (Emphasis added.)
46. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770.
47. 262 La. 270, 263 So. 2d 32 (1972).
48. Id. at 274, 263 So. 2d at 34. (Emphasis added.) The court's rationale was that
the district attorney, who had rested a taped confession on the jury railing, was allud-
ing to the defendant's failure to tell the police rather than making reference to the
accused's failure to take the stand. However, this rather dubious explanation might
well have been overlooked by the jury who could more easily have become aware of
the fact that the accused did not testify.
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ment bordered on being prejudicial."49 Further evidence that the
Louisiana supreme court has restrictively applied the prohibition
against indirect comment is the decision in State v. Cryer.51' There the
court upheld a conviction of selling marijuana in which the district
attorney, while pointing toward the defendant, made the following
argument:
Does ANYBODY deny that these two people [the defendants]
and Falcon were present that night . . . ? Does ANYBODY
attempt to refute this? No. Does ANYBODY, is there any evi-
dence to refute the fact that all three of them actively engaged
and participated . . .?5
The court found that "the thrust of the argument" 2 was merely that
there was no refuting evidence. Further, the court stated:
In the jurisprudence, this Court has drawn a distinction between
a statement that the State's evidence is uncontradicted and a
prohibited comment upon the failure of the defendant to testify.
The distinction has ample support in law and reason. Defense
evidence is not restricted to defendant's own testimony. It may
consist of the testimony of other witnesses and demonstrative
evidence."'
The court's application of this distinction fails to take account of the
fact that jurors have no knowledge of other witnesses subpoenaed nor
49. Id. at 275, 263 So. 2d at 34. Regardless of whether the court considers them
as comments on the failure of the accused to testify, many statements by the district
attorneys force the defendant to take the stand to cure their effect, and thus would
violate article 1, section 11 of the Louisiana constitution which provides that "no
person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case ....
See State v. Iverson, 251 La. 425, 427, 204 So. 2d 772, 774 (1967) (where the court
allowed the district attorney to argue that "had the deputy sheriff not taken a state-
ment from the defendant on the night of the alleged offense, that she would have
appeared in court . . . and lied . . . that the deceased had a knife in his hand.") See
also State v. Beach, 279 So. 2d 657 (La. 1973); State v. Hoover, 219 La. 872, 54 So. 2d
130 (1951).
50. 262 La. 575, 263 So. 2d 895 (1972).
51. Id. at 593, 263 So. 2d at 902.
52. Id. at 593, 263 So. 2d at 901. See United States v. White, 444 F.2d 1274, 1278
(5th Cir. 1971) (where the court stated that "[tihe test in determining whether such
a transgression has occurred is whether such remark was manifestly intended or was
'of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a
comment on the failure of the accused to testify.' ").
53. State v. Cryer, 262 La. 575, 593, 263 So. 2d 895, 901 (1972). The court in
applying this distinction has taken the language used in State v. Bentley, 219 La. 893,
54 So. 2d 137 (1951), that the "evidence is uncontradicted and uncontroverted" and
extended this to other statements by the district attorney which, under the circum-
[Vol. 34
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will they illogically reason that the defense has withheld demonstra-
tive evidence which might exonerate the accused. When the district
attorney is pointing his finger at the accused,"4 or when there is, to
the jury's knowledge, no one else to refute the state's evidence but
the defendant, ' such argument should be classified as an indirect
comment on his failure to take the stand. "
Extraneous Crimes and Prior Acts of Misconduct
It is not the purpose of this Comment to examine in depth the
stances, cannot simply be construed by the jury to mean that the evidence is unrefuted
by other witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Burch, 261 La. 3, 9, 258 So. 2d 851, 857 (1972)
(a forgery case where the prosecutor stated that: "We had three people who had access.
You've heard from two of them who told you, no, sir, I didn't sign that. Varn [the
prosecuting witness! says that's not my signature and I authorized no one to sign it.
Did they refute that? Did anybody get up here and say that Varn had authorized him,
no." In this case no one but the defendant could have taken the stand, therefore, this
should have been held to be indirect comment on that fact.). In State v. Bickham, 239
La. 1094, 1099, 121 So. 2d 207, 212 (1960), the statement that ("Gene Dyson's testi-
mony was not denied by the defense or anyone else," appears to be indirect comment
on the failure of the accused to testify when one considers the fact that the accused
was the only other person present. Oddly enough, the court found that it was immater-
ial that there were no other logical third party witnesses, although the jury must surely
have noted this.) See also State v. Reed, 284 So. 2d 574 (La. 1973).
54. Although the court in Cryer distinguished it, the case of State v. Robinson,
112 La. 939, 940, 36 So. 811, 812 (1904), seems very much in point. There the court
held it to be reversible error when the district attorney pointed his finger at the
defendant in arguing that "he has not denied it. He had the right under the law and
55. An interesting line of cases has developed concerning the district attorney's
argument as to the legal presumption of R.S. 15:432 that "the person in the unex-
plained possession of property recently stolen is the thief." The objection has been
made that argument to the effect that the defendant's possession is "unexplained"
constitutes indirect comment on the failure of the defendant to testify. While this
argument falls squarely within the prohibition of article 770(3), the court gives effect
to the specific statutory presumption. Such a presumption coupled with argument on
this fact may be violative of the defendant's constitutional rights. It goes further than
a merely rebuttable presumption as it destroys the presumption of innocence and
places an affirmative burden on the accused to take the stand in cases where he is the
only one who can explain how he came into possession of the goods. By forcing the
accused to take the stand it destroys his privilege against self-incrimination by "mak-
ing its assertion costly." See State v. Nelson, 261 La. 153, 259 So. 2d 46 (1972); State
v. Issaac, 261 La. 487, 260 So. 2d 302 (1972); State v. Braxton, 257 La. 183, 241 So. 2d
763 (1970); State v. Odom, 247 La. 62, 169 So. 2d 909 (1964); State v. White, 247 La.
19, 169 So. 2d 894 (1964); State v. Shelby, 215 La. 637, 41 So. 2d 458 (1949); State v.
Nix, 211 La. 865, 31 So. 2d 1 (1947); State v. Pace, 183 La. 838, 165 So. 6 (1935).
56. The arbitrary limitation imposed by the court confining article 770(3) to com-
ment on the failure of the defendant to take the stand only if "direct and the inference
plain that such remark was intended to brirg the jury's attention to such fail-
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problem of other crimes evidence; '7 however, the relationship be-
tween the admissibility of such evidence and the permissible scope
of the district attorney's argument " deserves consideration. In State
v. Prieur,a Justice Barham, speaking for the majority, reflected a
definite change in the attitude of the Louisiana supreme court by
adopting "a limited, rather than expansive, approach to the admissi-
bility of other acts of misconduct,"' thus fully recognizing the preju-
dicial effect of such evidence." The rules limiting the use of other
crimes evidence can be seriously subverted by a district attorney in
his closing argument if the court adheres to its present rule that
reference to such evidence is permissible if the evidence was properly
admitted during earlier phases of the trial. The problem with judging
the propriety of these references by the admissibility of the evidence
is that the prosecution, without further restraint, may often utilize
this evidence to impress upon the jury the theory that the accused is
a person of bad character,"2 and, therefore, more likely to have com-
mitted the crime charged.
In State v. Kelly,"' an armed robbery trial, the defendant was
asked, "Did you ever stick anybody with a knife?" 4 He was also
questioned about his vagrancy and a suspected burglary. In his clos-
ing argument, the district attorney stated that "it was established on
this witness stand he already stabbed somebody." 5 Although the
ure, ... ", State v. Howard, 262 La. 270, 272, 263 So. 2d 32, 34 (1972), would better
be left to the legislature than the courts. If the comment is "direct" or "plainly an
inference" it should be prohibited.
57. See Comment, 33 LA. L. REV. 614 (1973); Comment, 33 LA. L. REV. 630 (1973).
58. If the district attorney in his argument "refers directly or indirectly to: (2)
Another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by the defendant as to
which evidence is not admissible," the court must declare a mistrial if the defendant
requests it. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770.
59. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
60. Id. at 128.
61. The court in Prieur noted that in addition to the res gestae exception in R.S.
15:447, the general rule of excluding evidence of other crimes and prior acts of miscon-
duct is also subject to the exceptions set out in R.S. 15:445 and 446 which allow the
admission of such evidence to prove knowledge, intent and system; and R.S. 15:495
which allows the introduction of convictions for impeachment purposes.
62. Evidence which only tends to show the bad character of the accused is inad-
missible, except in rebuttal when the accused has introduced evidence to show his good
character. LA. R.S. 15:481 (1950).
63. 262 La. 143, 262 So. 2d 501 (1972).
64. Id. at 144, 262 So. 2d at 502.
65. Id. at 146, 262 So. 2d at 504. See also State v. Carite, 244 La. 928, 929, 155
So. 2d 21, 22 (1963) (The court reversed a conviction where the district attorney argued
that "[blecause the defendant has not been convicted before does not mean it's the
first time he was arrested or possessed narcotics.").
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defense objected when this line of questioning was begun and ob-
jected to the closing argument, the trial court overruled both and
denied a motion for a mistrial. The Louisiana supreme court, holding
that the objection to the admissibility of such evidence was not
timely, affirmed." Justices Barham and Tate dissented, recognizing
that such argument went beyond the ostensible purpose for which it
was admitted, i.e., the question of credibility." They pointed out that
the district attorney "improperly used it in support of a thesis that
the defendant was a dangerous man." ' Again in State v. Moore' the
court, although reversing a rape conviction on rehearing, seemed to
consider the prosecutor's arguments referring to other crimes evi-
dence as simply a question of admissibility during the state's case-
in-chief. Justice Tate, however, in his concurring opinion on original
hearing, noted that the closing argument was so "replete with empha-
sis upon the defendant's committing two crimes"7"' that he doubted
whether he got a fair trial. Specifically, he referred to the fact that
"about 38% of the state's closing argument, and its entire rebuttal
argument, concerned other crimes and misconduct."'" Even if the
court finds such evidence admissible for some limited purpose, unre-
stricted reference to this evidence in the closing argument may under-
mine its legitimate aim by going much further, prejudicing the ac-
cused with character evidence.
2
Provocation: Its Effect on Rebuttal Argument
The scope of the state's rebuttal "shall be confined to answering
66. Again it should be pointed out that the use of other crimes evidence in a
closing argument is a separate and distinct problem, although it is interwoven with
the admissibility of such evidence in the state's case-in-chief. The evidence is only
admitted for limited purposes, and these are defeated if the prosecutor is allowed to
argue and comment as to other crimes in an unrestricted manner to show that the
defendant is a bad man.
67. State v. Kelly, 262 La. 143, 146, 262 So. 2d 501, 504 (1972).
68. Id. at 152, 262 So. 2d at 504.
69. 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973).
70. Id. at 783.
71. Id. While the case involved only one charge of rape, the district attorney
during his argument made the following remarks: "You have two young rape victims
. . ."; "about raping that woman-two young ladies"; "those two little girls..."; "In
this case we have two victims..."; and "his conduct against our society and particu-
larly against these young ladies." Id. at 783 n.1.
72. If Justice Tate had considered the scope of permissible argument relating to
other crimes evidence as a problem in itself rather than a question of admissibility,
he would have been afforded an independent ground for advocating a reversal of the
conviction instead of having to concur with "great reservations" due to the "present
doubtful interpretations of the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, and consider-
ing the limited nature of appellate review .. " Id. at 784.
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the argument of the defendant."' ' Even if defense counsel initially
engages in improper conduct, this language from article 774 should
not give the state unlimited bounds of rebuttal argument.
Viewed simply as a means of assuring a fair trial, reversal should
be granted despite provocation. If the remark is so improper as
to require reversal by other standards, it should not matter who
was originally to blame: for though the jury may realize the argu-
ment was in reply to one by the defense, it does not follow that
the misconduct will be discounted if it is persuasive in itself. 4
The Louisiana supreme court, however, in State v. Cascio" held that
the prosecutor's otherwise impermissible rebuttal to an improper ar-
gument of defense counsel affords no ground for reversal provided it
is a "necessary and reasonable explanation."'" The court in Cascio
added uncertainty by its purported adherence to State v. Brice"
which is cited as authority for the rule that rebuttal argument "in-
fringing upon constitutional rights could not be justified under any
circumstances." 7 Thus, where the retaliation is an obvious infringe-
ment of a constitutional right, such as a direct comment on the fail-
ure of the accused to testify,7" there is no doubt that the court will
reverse. However, if the remark is a "necessary and reasonable"'81
73. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 774.
74. Comment, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946, 972 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
75. 219 La. 819, 54 So. 2d 95 (1951).
76. Id. at 823, 54 So. 2d at 99; see State v. Wright, 251 La. 511, 202 So. 2d 381
(1967).
77. 163 La. 392, 111 So. 798 (1927).
78. State v. Cascio, 219 La. 819, 823, 54 So. 2d 95, 99 n.1 (1951). (Emphasis
added.) Actually, State v. Brice involved a reversal of a conviction due to the prosecu-
tor's argument in which the court held that he appealed to racial prejudice, and asked
the jurors to violate their oath and duty of giving the defendant a fair and impartial
trial. This has been expanded into the present rule. See State v. Wright, 251 La. 511,
205 So. 2d 381 (1967).
79. State v. Wright, 251 La. 511, 205 So. 2d 381 (1967).
80. The original hearing opinion in State v. Blackwell, No. 53,405 (Louisiana,
October 29, 1973), overruling prior jurisprudence, held that "the law applicable to the
case" includes the "harshness, oppressiveness, and effect of the penalty" which is
within the scope of argument set out in article 774. The court, however, further stated
that "this rule is limited to the statutory provisions themselves. The possibility of
parole, pardon, suspension, or probation unless contained in the statute is not a part
of the law of the case," and not a proper subject for argument. This rule would have
allowed the defense to argue the harshness of a penalty provision while the limitation
would not have permitted the district attorney to argue any mitigating factors in his
rebuttal unless they were in the statute. However, on rehearing the court reversed its
position, affirming the decision and prior jurisprudence that the penalty was not a
proper subject for argument to the jury.
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answer to the argument of the defense, Cascio seems to require the
affirmance even though the rebuttal was so improper that it would
ordinarily require reversal. This raises serious due process objections,
for if the court would ordinarily have held the impropriety to merit
reversal, the fact that it was in retaliation to defense counsel's prior
argument should be of little consequence if the defendant's right to
a-fair trial is recognized as the real issue.
Remedies
At the trial level, the judge has great discretionary power in
controlling the criminal process. 81 If the defendant timely objects to
an irrelevant or immaterial remark which "might create prejudice
against the defendant '8 2 in the eyes of the jury, (e.g., inflammatory
remarks and personal opinion), the trial judge shall admonish the
jury to disregard.": However, if the argument causes racial prejudice,
refers to inadmissible other crimes evidence, or constitutes a com-
ment on the failure of the accused to testify, the defendant is entitled
to a mandatory mistrial if he so requests. 4 Finally, the trial judge
may grant a motion for a new trial '- or declare a mistrial"' whenever
there is doubt as to whether the defendant has received a fair trial.
Article 841 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the
defense make a contemporaneous objection. However, one must rec-
ognize that the closing argument of the prosecutor may be so per-
meated with improprieties that constant objections may alienate the
jurors or underscore the remark rather than erase it from their
minds."7 Therefore, an objection at the end of the summation should
be considered timely, and in some cases should be allowed outside the
presence of the jury."8
81. The trial judge "has the duty to require that criminal proceedings shall be
conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and to so control
the proceedings that justice is done. A court has the power to punish for contempt."
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 17.
82. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 771. (Emphasis added.)
83. In most cases this will be deemed sufficient; however, this remedy is often
ineffective since the district attorney has already gotten his point across to the jurors
and the prejudicial impact is incalculable. As pointed out in Dunn v. United States,
307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962): "[Y]ou can't throw a skunk into the jury box and
expect them not to smell it."
84. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770.
85. Id. art. 851.
86. Id. art. 775.
87. See United States v. Briggs, 457 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sawyer, 347 F.2d 372 (4th
Cir. 1965). Cf. State v. Simpson, 247 La. 883, 175 So. 2d 255 (1965).
88. See United States v. Briggs, 457 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1972).
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When other crimes evidence is admitted, Prieur affords some
protection by requiring a limiting instruction at the time such evi-
dence is admitted in the state's case-in-chief and before the general
jury charge if the defendant requests it. However, it may be desirable
to go even further and make it mandatory that the trial judge, upon
request of the accused, issue instructions during the prosecutor's ar-
gument as to the limited purpose for which such evidence was admit-
ted. Such a guideline would alleviate the possibility that the jury
might disregard the other instructions and allow the district attorney
in his argument to leave the impression that the accused is a bad
man.
In viewing the scope of appellate review of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument, the deficiencies in Louisiana's
bill of exceptions procedure and its harmless error rule become quite
apparent." ' The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v.
California" indicated that prosecutorial comments in argument could
be constitutional error,"' in which case the federal rule of harmless
error must govern."2 Justice Barham has noted that although the
Louisiana supreme court may purport to do so, it cannot meet the
requirements of the federal test":' in light of State v. Barnes" which
89. See Comment, 33 LA. L. REV. 82 (1972).
90. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
91. In Chapman the court stated: "In fashioning a harmless-constitutional-error
rule, we must recognize that harmless-error rules can work very unfair and mischievous
results when, for example, highly important and persuasive evidence, or argument,
though legally forbidden, finds its way into a trial in which the question of guilt or
innocence is a close one." Id. at 22. (Emphasis added.) "Certainly error, constitutional
error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone
other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless." Id. at
24. (Emphasis added.)
92. The federal rule is that "before a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." 386 U.S. 18, 24. In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 256
(1969), the court indicated that there must be "'overwhelming' untainted evidence to
support the conviction." See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921: "A judgment or ruling shall
not be reversed by an appellate court on any ground unless in the opinion of the court
after an examination of the entire record, it appears that the error complained of has
probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to substantial rights of the
accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right."
93. See State v. Mixon, 258 La. 835, 850, 248 So. 2d 307, 312 (1971) (concurring
opinion); State v. McGregor, 257 La. 956, 963, 244 So. 2d 846, 848 (1971) (concurring
opinion) (The court there attempted to apply the federal rule to inflammatory remarks
in the prosecutor's argument.) See also State v. Hills, 259 La. 436, 455, 250 So. 2d 394,
401 (1971) (dissenting opinion); State v. Anderson, 254 La. 1107, 1140, 229 So. 2d 329,
341 (1969) (dissenting opinion); State v. Hopper, 253 La. 439, 451, 218 So. 2d 551, 555
(1969) (dissenting opinion).
94. 257 La. 1017, 245 So. 2d 159 (1971). See Note, 32 LA. L. REV. 360 (1972).
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limits review of the complete record only to those cases where the
transcript is part of the bill of exceptions;"5 and in view of the fact
that "article VII of the Louisiana Constitution limits review in crimi-
nal cases to questions of law, which according to the jurisprudence,
does not include inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence support-
ing a verdict""' since passing on the question of guilt or innocence is
a jury function.
While prosecutorial misconduct is presently viewed as a techni-
cal procedural problem, it is actually of constitutional dimension, '
striking at the heart of the accused's right to a fair trial by an impar-
tial jury." However, the supreme court's reluctance to disturb the
verdict on the ground of improper argument unless it is "thoroughly
convinced that the jury was influenced by the remarks, and that they
contributed to the verdict""' places a heavy burden on the defendant,
which is contrary to Chapman.
Conclusion
It is important to note that the basic question is always: Has the
accused, who is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty, been so
prejudiced by the misconduct as to have been denied his constitu-
tional right of a fair trial? Thus, in every case involving the district
attorney's argument, the court is confronted with the degree to which
95. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 841-45. The "entire record," pursuant to article 21, is
limited by the bill of exceptions procedure to "the objection, the ruling, and the facts
upon which the objection is based" as taken down by the court stenographers when
the bill of exceptions is reserved.
96. Comment, 33 LA. L. REV. 82, 91 (1972).
97. Id. See Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50
TEX. L. REv. 629 (1972); Singer, Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-And
How It Grew, 20 AIA. L. REV. 227 (1968); Note, 83 HAJv. L. REV. 814 (1970).
98. An additional post-conviction remedy available to the defendant is provided
by article 362(9) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which allows a writ of habeas
corpus to be issued if it is found that the defendant was "convicted without due process
of law." The comment to this article suggests that the federal habeas corpus is as broad
as the due process concept itself, and this remedy is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
if the accused has exhausted all other remedies. However, the Fifth Circuit in the
recent case of Bryant v. Caldwell, 484 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1973), indicated that federal
prosecutors are subject to more restrictive standards of argument than state prosecu-
tors, and was therefore reluctant in a habeas corpus proceeding to order the release of
a prisoner convicted in a Georgia state court. But see United States ex rel. Haynes v.
McKendrick, 350 F. Supp. 990 (S.D. N.Y. 1972) (where the court did find a federal
question raised by allegations of improprieties in argument and ordered the release or
retrial of the prisoner upon finding that he had not received his due process rights to
a fair trial).
99. State v. Dennis, 250 La. 125, 194 So. 2d 720 (1967).
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such argument may have affected the constitutional rights of the
defendant. In the interest of assuring justice and fair-play at the
summation stage of the criminal trial, one should not engage in
subjective determinations of guilt or innocence either at the trial or
appellate level, but leave this question to an impartial jury by apply-
ing the rules of argument to both the state and defendant.
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